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We can only but share Miller's views that cognitive science is born in the 1950s, at a time when 
psychology, anthropology and linguistics were redefining themselves and computer science and 
neuroscience as disciplines were coming into existence. 
We however think that some statements in the article distort the historical contribution of 
scientific psychology in the concert of disciplines that have grounded cognitive science. On two 
occasions, Miller espouses the view that psychology could not participate in the cognitive 
revolution because this discipline was still trapped in a narrow behaviorism. We would like to 
stress that this opinion only applies to the American tradition (with some notable exceptions such 
as the Gestalt oriented school of  Tolman and others) and not to the European (including Russian) 
historical backgrounds, theoretical inquiries and genuine contributions to the emerging field of 
cognitive sciences. 
While behaviorism flourished in the US and until the the time it ended, two prominent 
developmental psychologists, Piaget in Switzerland and Vygotsky in Russia set the paths for a 
integrated view of the human mind. Vygotsky, elaborated a socio-historical approach to cognitive 
development that emphasized the way according to which development is constructed through 
social interaction, cultural practices, and the internalization of cognitive tools. We will not 
comment further on this endeavour, but clearly the goals of Vygotsky's enterprises and its long 
lasting influence indicate how this researcher's projects were in the heart of the cognitive  
sciences [1]. 
Piaget (initially trained as a zoologist) and known today as a reputed developmental psychologist 
was in fact fascinated by one single question, namely  the process of the growth of knowledge 
with the goal to clarify its meaning as a function of its mode of construction, both  in the course 
of history of scientific ideas and during the development of the infant and the child. 
Miller relates the creation in 1960 by Bruner at Harvard of the Center for Cognitive Studies. Five 
years earlier, Piaget had founded in Geneva the International Center for Genetic Epistemology 
(ICGE) with the financial support of the Rockfeller Foundation (Piaget  humorously narrates in 
Insights and Illusions of Philosophy [2] his negociations with the Rockfeller Foundation that has 
supported the Center for 7 successive years). The Center was active for more than 30 years and 
has gathered scientists from all over the world. Its work resulted in the publications of 36 
volumes in a special collection published by the Presses Universitaires de France (Paris). A 
number of volumes s are available in  English (e.g., [3] for the most recent one). The very heart 
of genetic epistemology was interdisciplinary and was clearly stated by Piaget in the following 
terms "to work in such a discipline it does not suffice to be a psychologist vaguely acquainted 
with a smattering of philosophy and biology:  one must be, moreover, a logician, a 
mathematician, a physicist, a cybernetist and a historian of sciences, to mention the essential" [2], 
(p. 44). 
The research programs that came out ed on both sides of the Atlantic (i.e. at the Harvard Center 
for Cognitive Studies and at the International Center for Genetic Epistemology in Geneva) shared 
a common certainty : the study of mind could not be achieved by a single discipline and required 
the contribution of conceptual and methodological tools borrowed in different scientific fields. 
Now, beyond this historical convergence, the two projects have differed on an crucial dimension. 
Miller’s story of the American cognitive revolution leaves the reader with the impression that 
interdisciplinarity was conceived of and pursued as a scientific objective in itself. By contrast, the 
interdisciplinary nature of the ICGE project was clearly stated as a mean in the service of a 
broader and theoretically founded research program, namely  the study of mind and knowledge as 
biological products of a developmental process. Stressing this distinction may help explaining 
historical outcomes of the cognitive revolution and also be informative for the future of cognitive 
sciences. Despite the mutiplicity of the links established between disciplines (see Miller’s 
polygon), there is no doubt that one of the most influential connexion for cognitive revolution 
occurred between psychology and computer science, the latter providing a long lasting metaphor 
for the former. No doubt, also, that computerized simulation has represented a very fruitful way 
for modelling cognitive processes. However, this success contributed to maintaining a relative 
confusion between the aim of the cognitive revolution (i.e. rehabilitating the study of mind) and 
one of its powerfool tool (computer simulation). This confusion, along with its reductionnist 
counterparts, led Bruner to withdraw from this perspective during the post-revolution years, 
stating that the revolution he helped to initiate missed its objective  [4]. Computers do not 
develop, nor do they build representations and meanings, and it is now well recognized that 
performance match between computer responses and human responses can not represent the 
absolute criteria for modelling biologically based behaviors  [5]. Another approach to cognitive 
science emerged in Europe during these years. This approach did not only inspire « a small army 
of followers » (Miller, in press, p. 38) ; more importantly  it shaped a complementary perspective 
on cognition, developmental and cultural in nature. According to such views for which Piaget and 
Vygotsky were the main proponents, the organization of the human mind is the product of a 
biologically and culturally mediated process of development. Hence, studying  human mind  
could not be achieved without studying the developmental mechanisms that give rise to cognitive 
abilities and constrain their organization. This research program was born in the 50’s, and is still 
alive, « taking the developmental perspective seriously » [6].  
 
“The only duty we owe history is to rewrite it”. 
Oscar Wilde  
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